Supreme Court Cases

Jacob Doe v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.

The case

In January and February of 2012, Attorney McNamara represented a clergy sexual abuse victim in the first case ever tried against the Archdiocese of Hartford for damages due to sexual abuse by an Archdiocese priest. The Plaintiff, then a 43 year-old man named “Jacob Doe,” brought an action of negligence and recklessness against the Archdiocese for being sexually abused by Reverend Ivan Ferguson from 1981–1983 when he was 13–15 years old.

The lawsuit alleged that the Archdiocese failed to adequately supervise Ferguson, failed to remove him from any position within the Archdiocese of Hartford, and failed to warn or advise its congregations, parishioners, and employees, as well as the plaintiff’s parents, of the threat Ferguson posed, as the Archbishop had received previous complaints of Ferguson sexually abusing young boys.

In Jacob Doe’s brave and emotional testimony, he described the abuse, which included Ferguson providing the boys with liquor, showing them pornography, fondling, oral sex, and eventual sodomy, which occurred in the basement of Saint Mary’s School.

The ruling

The jury found that the Archdiocese’s conduct was not only negligent but reckless with regard to its handling of the previous complaints of Ferguson’s sexual abuse of boys. It found that both the Archdiocese’s negligence and recklessness was a proximate cause of the injuries and damages sustained by the Plaintiff, returning a verdict of $1,000,000.00. Judge Kevin Dubay granted the plaintiff’s motion for punitive damages and costs due to the finding of recklessness against the Archdiocese.

The appeal

The Archdiocese appealed and the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, resulting in a final recovery for the plaintiff of $1,661,413.50.

The precedent

The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the admission of deposition statements from the offending deceased priest was reasonably necessary testimony. His statements had been given under oath, they contained information that was consistent with other evidence admitted at trial, and they were supported by equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability. The Court also found that Connecticut General Statutes § 52–577d, which allows sexual abuse victims to bring their cases up to age 48, did not violate the Archdiocese’s substantive due process rights under Article First, §§ 8 & 10 of the Connecticut State Constitution. The Connecticut Supreme Court also upheld the preclusion of trial testimony from the Archdiocese’s proposed expert, who was expected to testify about how child molestation was viewed in the 1970s and 1980s, in an effort to essentially excuse the conduct of the Archdiocese.

The Court’s evidentiary rulings in Jacob Doe were adopted in the commentary to the Connecticut Code of Evidence as to Sections 7-2 and 8-9. These rulings are to be interpreted by trial judges as binding precedent as to these sections of the Code.

McDermott v. State of Connecticut

The case

In 2005, a six-person State of Connecticut Department of Transportation (CDOT) work crew was dispatched to remove a 55-foot-tall sugar maple tree in Cromwell. Later in the day, after all of the tree’s limbs and some of its trunk had been removed, Bill McDermott, 77, walked along the sidewalk and approached the worksite.

While Bill stood between two members of the crew, the next section of the trunk was removed. It fell to the ground in a controlled manner but hit a log on the ground that was propelled upward. It struck Bill in the forehead, causing him to fall backward and hit his head on the ground. He died a day later in the hospital from the injuries he sustained.

Bill’s widow, Madeline, later sought a wrongful death ruling against the State for loss of consortium.

The ruling

The State’s position was that this event was not foreseeable and, consequently, the CDOT had no duty to Bill McDermott. It was argued that cones placed on the sidewalk were not there to stop pedestrians from walking through the area, but rather, to show there was work taking place ahead.

Expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff stated that the CDOT had breached the standard of care in securing the worksite by 1) failing to designate a person to keep pedestrians out of the work zone, 2) failing to communicate properly so that people were stationed in the correct spot, 3) failing to train the personnel properly to protect pedestrians, and 4) failing to manage the site properly. Therefore, Bill should not have been allowed into the work zone and his injuries were caused by these failures.

Judge Abrams found that the general type of harm that resulted from the tree-removal operation and had killed Bill was a foreseeable event. Bill’s estate was awarded $850,000.00, and Madeline McDermott was awarded $435,000.00 in loss of consortium damages.

The precedent

The Connecticut Supreme Court clarified the law with regard to the applicability of industry standards as evidence to be applied in negligence cases.

The State took the position that compliance with tree-removal standards for tree workers was the appropriate standard of care to evaluate the pedestrian’s claim. In other words, the standards for worker safety applied to pedestrian safety as well.

However, Judge Dennis Eveleigh, writing the unanimous opinion for the Court, held that the evidence of compliance with the industry standard is not an absolute bar to liability. Rather, it’s but “one piece of information” for the trier of fact to consider. He held that the standard to be used was the general negligence standard of duty, breach, causation, and actual injury.

In a post-retirement interview, Justice Eveleigh mentioned McDermott v. State when asked about a case that illustrated his values as an appellate judge, viewing his decision as an opportunity to clarify Connecticut’s law of foreseeability and the duty that it creates.

Cole v. City of New Haven

The case

In 2011, New Haven police officer Nikki Curry, operating a city police cruiser, was responding to anonymous complaints of dirt bikes and “quads” recklessly being driven in the area of Howard Avenue. She spotted the group, which included the plaintiff, Amaadi Cole, who was traveling approximately 25 miles per hour and not doing wheelies or other stunts.

Without warning, Curry executed a roadblock maneuver by pulling her cruiser diagonally across the double-yellow line into the southbound lane directly in front of the riders. To avoid collision, Amaadi went up on the sidewalk where he struck a tree. He suffered serious injuries, including almost complete loss of vision in his right eye, brain damage, and a fractured femur.

Amaadi sued the City of New Haven and Curry. In his complaint, he alleged that Curry had violated several police department policies and procedures, state regulations, and statutes when she engaged in the roadblock. Cole alleged the town was liable for Curry’s negligence under § 52-557n and for indemnification under § 7-465. The defendants filed a special defense of governmental immunity for discretionary acts under § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). In avoidance of the special defense, Amaadi claimed that Curry had violated ministerial duties and that the plaintiff was an identifiable person subject to imminent harm, which would have defeated the governmental immunity defense.

The ruling

The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, holding that Curry’s decision to drive her cruiser into the oncoming traffic lane was a discretionary act for which Curry and the City were immune from liability.

The appeal

On appeal, Amaadi claimed that the trial court’s holding was incorrect because Curry’s actions violated several policies that imposed ministerial duties regarding roadblocks, the operation of police vehicles, and pursuits. The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff and concluded that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff had established the existence of a ministerial duty, forbidding roadblocks in this circumstance, under the applicable city and state policies and a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the factual predicate for that ministerial duty.

The precedent

This landmark decision paved the way for subsequent cases, granting rights to citizens harmed by the acts of municipal employees, changing the course of an area of law that historically was not friendly to those bringing lawsuits against municipalities and their employees.